ARTICLES ON THE UNITED FRONT AND ON STRIKE STRUGGLES IN THE U. S. A.



THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

ORGAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Published twice a month in English, Russian, German, French, Chinese and Spanish.

VOL. XI | SEPTEMBER 5, 1934 | No. 17

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WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS, P. O. BOX 148, STA. D, NEW YORK CITY
Subscription price: one year, $2; six months, $1.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNITED FRONT IN FRANCE

THE consistent struggle of the Communist Party of France for the united front and for the unity of action of the proletariat has recently led to the first palpable results, namely, that on July 27 an agreement was signed between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France and the permanent Administrative Commission of the Socialist Party to carry on joint activity against fascism, war and the emergency laws.

This agreement was not born in "empty space". The conclusion of this agreement was preceded by two years of stubborn work on the part of the French Communists for the formation of a powerful anti-fascist and anti-war movement (the so-called Amsterdam-Pleyel movement). Despite the prohibition of the leading organs of the Socialist Party, tens of thousands of socialist workers, hundreds of local organizations, and whole federations of socialists participated in this movement. The conclusion of the agreement was also preceded by actually bringing about the unity of action of the proletariat against fascism during the February events, when over a million workers, among whom were hundreds of thousands of socialists, responded to the call of the Communist Party and organized anti-fascist street demonstrations in reply to the attempt made to bring about a fascist putsch on February 6. The ground for this agreement was also prepared by the powerful united action of the French working class in the shape of the general strike against fascism on February 12 in which over 4,000,000 workers took part.

The conclusion of this general agreement was also assisted by the agreement for joint action decided on between the Communist organizations in the Paris district and the socialist federations of the Seine and Seine-Oise, and also by the successful joint actions undertaken against fascism and the emergency laws. These agreements and joint actions led to concrete results which affected the material conditions of tens of thousands of workers and office workers in Paris.

It can therefore be stated without exaggeration that the success of the united front in France is a victory of no small importance for the Communist Party which in practice led the movement for unity of millions of Communist, socialist, and non-party workers in France.

According to the agreement which has been made,

> " . . . the Communist and Socialist Parties undertake to jointly organize a campaign throughout the country and to operate it, utilizing all the means at their disposal (organizations, press, Party functionaries, elected officers, etc.). The campaign has the aim of mobilizing all the toiling population (a) against the fascist organizations and *to disarm and dissolve the latter;* (b) defending democratic liberties, for the proportional system of electoral representation, and for the dissolution of Parliament; (c) against the preparations for war; (d) against the emergency laws; (e) against the fascist terror in Germany and Austria and for the liberation of Thaelmann, Karl Seitz and all imprisoned anti-fascists."

The agreement provides for this campaign to be conducted by meetings, street demonstrations and anti-fascist counter-demonstrations. Such a method of activity is decided on by the contracting parties with a view to "bringing about wide mass actions of struggle against the emergency laws". The members of the two organizations concluding the agreement must give help to each other in case of a conflict of the supporters of either of the organizations with the fascists, with the armed forces of the bourgeoisie. During the joint activity, both Parties will refrain from mutual criticism, but outside these joint actions maintain full independence in all spheres, both in agitation and propaganda and in the recruitment of new members, etc. A commission composed of an equal number of representatives of the Central Committees of the Communist and Socialist Parties is set up to elaborate a plan of joint activity and to regulate possible conflicts and disputed questions. This is the essence of the agreement.

Is this an ideal agreement? Does it completely satisfy the French Communists? Of course it does not. Of course it is not what the Communists would like, as supporters of the proletarian revolution and the proletarian dictatorship. The leaders of the French Socialist Party, moreover, considerably narrowed down the scope of the agreement. Taking into consideration the present intense situation in France, it would undoubtedly be more advisable and more profitable for the interests of the proletariat, to develop the joint actions on a wider scale, and to use more effective methods of struggle, which would undoubtedly give still bigger results. But our French comrades have not yet been able to bring this about. The socialist leaders had already broken off negotiations on one occasion, and it was only due to the pressure which the masses exerted on the Socialist Party, only due to the noticeable growth of the influence of the Communist Party, to the efforts and concessions made by our French comrades, concessions in the interests of the united front, that nonetheless an agreement has been reached. It is plain that the united front organized with the participation of the leaders of the

Socialist Party made concessions essential on the part of the Communists. But these concessions were not one-sided. The concessions made by the Socialist Party consisted in that the latter has agreed, at the present moment and on the given question, and under the pressure of the masses in the struggle against fascism, to adopt certain methods of the class struggle as provided for in the agreement reached. It is another question as to what were the motives which guided the leaders of the Socialist Party, whether they wanted to use the past as a safety valve so as to avoid an outbreak of the mass movement, or whether they wanted to "frighten" the French bourgeoisie a little so as to prepare for a renewal of class collaboration in conditions more favorable for their party. The concessions of the Socialist Party further consisted in the fact that it gave up its original proposal ("non-aggression pact") and agreed to accept a new agreement for joint struggle against fascism, against the emergency laws and against war preparations. The concessions of the Communist Party, on the other hand, consisted in the fact that in the interests of unity of action it consented, when carrying through joint actions with the Socialist Party, to limit itself merely to methods of struggle which are acceptable to the latter. As we see, these concessions are by no means of equal importance.

What concessions were made by the Communist Party of France in the interests of the united front?

Firstly, our Party agreed to refrain from criticism of the Socialist Party during the period of joint activity. This is a very serious concession on the part of the Communists. The Communists would willingly allow criticism of their actions by the Socialist Party, for they do not fear being criticized by the socialists, since on all basic questions (the economic crisis, war, fascism, etc.), the course of events has confirmed the correctness of the analysis made by the Communists, and of their point of view, their tactics and their program. But in the interest of unity of action, the French Communists agreed to refrain from mutual criticism. They went still further. They agreed not only to refrain from criticism on all urgent political questions during the period of the joint activity, but they also agreed to put aside the discussion of even theoretical differences. They agreed to this concession even though the socialists previously put forward the proposal themselves to arrange joint theoretical discussions.

If, when conducting their general campaign on the question of the twentieth anniversary of the imperialist war, certain Communists understood this as meaning that the Party has to gloss over the role of the Second International and its sections during the war, it would no longer be "abstention from criticism" but a distortion of historic facts.

Secondly, our French comrades proposed to include a point in the agreement on the necessity of developing mass activity right up to the point of strikes against the exceptional laws. But here again they were forced to make still another concession, and instead of clearly and unequivocally posing the question of forms and methods of activity, they agreed to include a fairly hazy formulation in the agreement, about "broad actions of struggle". In the country where the capitalist offensive is taking place against the working class and where there is no broad strike movements as yet directed against this offensive, such a restriction of the joint actions of the two parties is a serious concession to the socialists. This concession of the "Communists to the Socialist Party" does not of course bind the independent activity of the Communist Party.

Thirdly, the French comrades at one time had proposed to include a point in the agreement stating that those who violated the agreement must be mercilessly exposed to the working class. Why was this point not included in the agreement? It was not the fault of the Communists, who are vitally interested in the agreement being conscientiously carried out, and who have come forward whole-heartedly for the united front of struggle of the working class against fascism, against the bourgeoisie. The Communists are not frightened by measures of struggle directed against those who violate the agreement because they have never thought of violating it and do not think of doing so now. In the agreement it merely says very vaguely that "each party undertakes to put a stop to all violations and shortcomings such as may arise inside their own organizations in regard to the common activities undertaken".

Instead of clear and definite language, we have here an indefinite undertaking to bring pressure to bear by "inner party" methods on those who sabotage the struggle against fascism. This, of course, is not what the Communists would like.

But in spite of the fact that the agreement cost the French Communists very dear, it is nevertheless a positive factor, not only for the French proletariat, but also for the entire international working class movement.

It is plain that the conclusion of an agreement on unity of action between the Communist and Socialist Parties does not by any means remove the differences of principle between these two parties. We are speaking of unity of action and not of the organizational unity of the two parties. Organizational unity is an entirely different thing. It presupposes not only a recognition of the class struggle but also unity in principle as to the aims and methods of this struggle, *i.e.*, unity on the basis of the program

and tactics of the Comintern. But it is precisely on these basic questions that a fathomless gulf exists between the Communist and Socialist Parties of France. The Communists are for the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the socialists are against the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Communists are for the violent overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, for Soviets; the socialists are for bourgeois democracy and against Soviet Power. The Coimmunists are unreservedly for the U.S.S.R. as the first proletarian fatherland of the toilers of all countries, and consequently are for its defense; the Socialist Party, on the contrary, is for the "defense" of its bourgeois "fatherland", and carried on until recently a systematic campaign to discredit the U.S.S.R., etc.

Nevertheless the Communist Party of France acted correctly when, while reserving the right to carry on propaganda for its complete unabridged program, to carry on activity with a view to winning the workers over to Communism on the basis of this program, it nevertheless made a number of very serious concessions in the interests of agreement. It acted correctly because the matter in question was the united front of struggle and not organizational unity. It showed itself to be a genuine and loyal supporter of the unity of struggle of the working class, precisely by not putting forward the slogan of organizational unity, being well aware that today many of the socialist workers are not yet convinced of the correctness of the Communist program and tactics, but that they are determinedly in favor of joint action with the Communists in the struggle against fascism, against emergency laws, etc. Only political crooks and actual supporters of a split of the ranks of the working class, such as Doriot, can play with the slogan of organizational unity so as thereby to hinder the unity of the struggle of the working class of France.

It is clear that when signing the agreement with the Socialist Party against fascism, war and the emergency laws, the C.P.F. by no means pledged itself to limit its activity only to the actions indicated in the agreements. While the leaders of the Socialist Party considered it necessary to limit in every way the operation of the agreement and the adoption of more effective methods of struggle, the Communists on the other hand, in the interests of the united front, agreed to this concession. This does not, however, do away with the fact, but even pre-supposes that the C.P.F. will carry on an open struggle for its program, for Soviet Power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and will bring forward *all questions* of the class struggle independently and apart from the restrictions in the agreement; it will explain to the masses its own position on all vital questions and will endeavor to *organize independent mass actions,* and adopt the most *varied forms of struggle, including strikes,* wherever conditions permit, against fascism, the emergency laws and war. The C.P.F. must supply the anti-fascist struggle with real contents, by developing the struggle for the immediate economic and political demands of the working class, the toiling peasants and the toiling strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie.

The extension of the united front struggle of the proletariat, and the transition to more effective revolutionary methods of struggle against fascism and the emergency laws will take place all the sooner in proportion as the masses of workers and toilers establish unity of action from below on the basis of concrete demands, which involve the most burning and the most vital questions of the present day. The agreement between the Socialist and Communist Parties is capable of unleashing this activity of the wide masses. In its turn, the new upsurge of the revolutionary struggle of the masses in the factories, trade unions, etc., will assist in extending and revolutionizing the united actions of the proletariat on an international scale.

The preservation of the independent political identity of the Communist Party, the resistance to all the attempts of the reformist leaders to disrupt the fighting agreement already arrived at, to narrow down the united front, and, what is more, to limit the independent role of the Communist Party, constitute a necessary condition for the achievement of further success in the struggle of the French proletariat against fascism.

Finally, in order to fulfill its historic task for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Socialism, and for Soviet Power, and to have the necessary strength to rally the masses in the struggle for the united front, the C.P.F. cannot but pay the maximum of attention to questions of consolidating its ranks, to recruiting thousands of new fighters into the only revolutionary party, and to forming new and consolidating the already existing cells, etc.

The carrying out of this activity not only does not contradict the agreement, but is formally permitted by it.

In the socialist press it is alleged that the agreement reached between the Communist Party of France and the Socialist Party signifies that the C.P. of France and the Comintern have adopted new tactics, namely tactics of collaboration with the Socialist Parties. Is this true? No, it is not true. The Comintern and its Sections have always stood for the united front struggle of the working class, stand for it now, and will do so in the future. There is nothing new in this. The new feature is the turn which has taken place in the sentiments of the socialist workers. The new feature is the fact that during recent years the bourgeoisie has changed its

attitude towards social-democracy in a number of countries. While the leaders of the socialist parties collaborated with the bourgeois governments or directly participated in them, they systematically and stubbornly rejected the proposals of the Communist Parties to establish the united front of struggle. Such was the case in Germany, France, Czechoslovakia, Spain, etc. In places where the socialists had not entered the bourgeois governments, they did not lose hopes of doing so and therefore did not want to "compromise" themselves in the eyes of the bourgeoisie by making agreements with the Communists.

The bloody experiences of fascism in Germany and Austria, where the bourgeoisie in its transition to open fascist dictatorship threw social-democracy aside for a time, caused a turn in the sentiments of the socialist workers of the entire capitalist world who became disillusioned with the famous "democratic path to socialism" and who began to turn from social-democracy, towards Communism, towards joint revolutionary class struggle against fascism with the Communists. Nevertheless the leaders of Czechoslovakian social-democracy, who are members of the government, still reject the proposals of the Czech Communists regarding the united front of struggle. The Swiss social-democrats, who have formed a bloc with their bourgeoisie, have taken up a similar position. The British Labor Party has rejected the proposal for a united front. Therefore it should be emphasized that however great the pressure of the working class, it is nevertheless not sufficient to compel the social-democratic leaders to abandon the policy of class collaboration. Hence, it is clear that the question of the united front on an international scale does not depend on the Comintern but on the Second International and its sections which continue in most countries to apply the tactics of splitting the working class with a view to establishing their unity with the bourgeoisie. And there is no need to have any illusions in this regard, because the bankruptcy of German fascism (since the events of June 30), and of Austrian fascism (after the national-socialist putsch), a bankruptcy becoming ever more clear and which fosters utopian hopes in the ranks of social-democracy to the effect that the fascist dictatorship will automatically collapse, may again strengthen the political position of those social-democratic elements who are dreaming of new possibilities for collaboration with the bourgeoisie; it is no chance that Vandervelde has written an article in the bulletin of the Second International against the formation in France of a united front of struggle against fascism.

All genuine supporters of the united struggle of the working class, irrespective of whether they are Communists or socialists, must now be on guard. It is true that at present only the first modest step has been taken towards bringing the Communist and socialist workers nearer together in one single country on the basis of a joint struggle against fascism. But this step corresponds to the closest thoughts and sentiments of the working class. Anyone who tries to undermine the rapprochement which has been begun risks a great deal, about all his prestige in the eyes of the workers. However imperfect these first attempts of the French workers to establish a united front of struggle may be, however critical may be the remarks they have called forth, the task facing the supporters of unity is to widen and consolidate this unity of struggle in France.

But to widen and consolidate this unity means to develop the maximum initiative of the lower organizations of both parties in the struggle against the fascist danger. This is now the crux of the whole question if the Communist and socialist workers want to go forward and not backwards in the struggle for the unity of the working class. The further success of the united front struggle of the workers in France also depends on the real control by the lower organized and unorganized masses over the loyal fulfillment of the agreement reached. And the degree to which it will spread to other countries depends on the extent to which the united front of struggle is consolidated and extended in France. Good examples are contagious. Imitation which takes on a mass character will inevitably break the resistance of those who are against this elementary unity in the struggle of the proletariat. On the basis of the experience of the French Communist Party, the Communists of other capitalist countries must realize that the struggle for the working class united front consists not of periodically sending out "open letters" and registering refusals, but of everyday systematic work for unity which convinces the masses that only the Communist Party is a genuine fighter for the militant unity of the working class, without which a proletarian revolution is impossible.



THE SAN FRANCISCO GENERAL STRIKE AND ITS LESSONS

By B. SHERMAN

THE general strike in San Francisco and surrounding cities, and the Pacific Coast maritime workers' struggle which led up to it, took place in the midst of the second big wave of strike struggles sweeping the United States and continually rising in the level of militancy and displaying an ever more clearly defined political character.

The longshoremen's strike on the Pacific Coast broke out on May 9 around the demands for higher wages, the 30-hour week, union control of the hiring halls, and a united West Coast agreement with a uniform expiration date. The strike from the first was under the leadership of the militant rank and file in the A. F. of L. longshoremen's union, the Industrial Longshoremen's Association, and was called in spite of every effort of the district and national officials to prevent it. The strike rapidly spread to the seamen under the leadership of the Marine Workers Industrial Union, which forced the A. F. of L. seamen's union to call their members on strike as well. In a short time, ten maritime unions were involved, with a total of 35,000 strikers, and all shipping activity on the Pacific Coast was completely tied up. In San Francisco, the strongest and most militant center of the strike, a united strike committee of 50 was set up, with five representatives each from the ten different unions.

From the first the strike met with the most violent attacks by the police, armed strike-breakers, and the National Guard against the mass picket lines, and in a number of pitched battles four strike pickets were killed and over 300 injured. At the same time the capitalist press launched a violent attack on the militant strike leadership, and tried to whip up an anti-Communist hysteria without success. The sympathy of the workers for the strikers expressed itself in the rapidly spreading sentiment for a general strike. Forty thousand workers attended the funeral of the two pickets killed, one of whom was a member of the Communist Party.

Movements for local general strikes had already taken place recently in many centers throughout the country, in support of the Toledo auto workers, Minneapolis truck drivers, Butte miners, Milwaukee carmen, and on the Pacific Coast. The workers in Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and San Pedro were demanding a general strike in sympathy with the striking maritime workers and against the police and military terror of the government. Only in San Francisco, however, did the general strike materialize because precisely in San Francisco the leadership of the maritime strike was firmly in the hands of the militant rank and file strongly influenced by the Party, and the whole strike assumed the character of a united front struggle against the employers and the government.

The reason for our strength in San Francisco, as distinguished from other strike situations where the Party stood on the outside of the struggle, is that already in the middle of 1933, when the majority of the longshoremen showed their desire to belong to the A. F. of L., the Communists actively participated in the organization of the longshoremen into the A. F. of L. local union. The A. F. of L. district and national officials of the I.L.A. worked day and night to prevent the strike from taking place and, after it broke out, to send the men back to work, but their every effort and their every maneuver was defeated by the local strike leadership which represented the sentiments of the rank and file.

The firm stand of the strike leadership in San Francisco also helped to influence and strengthen the position of the strike in the other Pacific Coast centers, where to a large extent the rank and file was also able to gain control. The National Longshoremen's Arbitration Board appointed by Roosevelt made strenuous efforts to break the strike and submit the strikers' demands to arbitration, but neither they nor the A.F. of L. leaders succeeded in this. When the A.F. of L. leaders signed an arbitration agreement, the strikers rejected it and Ryan, the I.L.A. national president, received such a hostile reception at the strikers' meeting that he was unable to speak.

The policy of the Party was to spread the strike, not only to all branches of the marine industry on the Pacific Coast, but to the Atlantic and Southern ports. However, our extremely weak position in the A.F. of L. unions in those other ports made it impossible to spread the strike into a national strike of longshoremen and seamen. Only in a few instances was the Marine Workers Industrial Union able to call strikes of seamen on a few ships.

In the face of the unyielding position of the employers, the question of developing a movement for a general strike in Pacific Coast ports in support of the maritime strikers, became an extremely urgent one. The influence of the Party among the strikers was so great that the San Francisco strike committee *decided to make the "Western Worker"*, (the Com-

munist Party weekly organ on the Pacific Coast) *their official strike organ.* The strike committee, after enlisting the support of the A.F. of L. and revolutionary unions in the marine industry, further extended its activities for the development of the general strike in San Francisco, the sentiment for which spread rapidly.

Local union after local union voted in favor of the general strike. A mass meeting of 18,000 workers called by the Maritime Strike Committee cheered the slogan of "general strike". The A.F. of L. leaders of the San Francisco Central Labor Council moved heaven and earth to head off the movement, and even wired President Roosevelt to intervene to prevent a general strike. President William Green telegraphed to the Seattle Central Labor Council warning them that a general strike would violate the laws of the American Federation of Labor, and would be unauthorized.

In San Francisco, the local labor leaders set up a "Strategy Committee", to hold off action and dissipate the movement. However, when the Maritime Strike Committee called a conference of the A.F. of L. unions to discuss a general strike, at which 26 local unions were represented, the local labor misleaders, fearing that the movement would go over their heads and slip out of their hands, changed their tactics and decided to head the movement in order to be better able to behead it. They called a special conference attended by 115 local unions, where only three local unions voted against the general strike, and a general strike committee was set up, to which each local was to appoint or elect five representatives.

The Party mobilized for the election of representatives, while the A.F. of L. strove to get only officials appointed. The real power, however, was in the hands of an executive committee of 25, consisting of officials appointed by the labor bureaucrats, and including only one militant representative, the leader of the striking longshoremen. It should be noted that at the time the A.F. of L. leaders called the special conference, the momentum of the general strike movement had reached such a character that the economic life of San Francisco was already partially paralyzed by strikes of teamsters, street-car men, butchers, etc., and other trades were preparing to walk out in the following day or two.

The General Strike began on July 16 in San Francisco, spreading on the following day to other nearby cities, Oakland, Berkeley, and Alameda, until it involved about 125,000 workers in a metropolitan area whose population was 1,200,000. Everything was at a complete standstill, and the only operations permitted were a few restaurants, truck deliveries to hospitals, etc., under strike committee permits. Every day, however, the misleaders heading the executive committee relaxed the tie-up by issuing more and more permits for business activity, preparing for the final sell-out.

Meanwhile, the press opened a hysterical campaign against the Communists, and shrieked about "revolution" and "insurrection". The employers radioed an appeal to Roosevelt, on board a warship bound for Honolulu, to cancel his trip and come to San Francisco to settle the strike. Senator Wagner flew by plane to Portland, and succeeded at the last minute in averting the general strike which threatened there. General Hugh Johnson, head of the N.R.A., came to San Francisco and gave the keynote for the terror wave which followed, when in a provocative speech he called upon the A.F. of L. leaders to wipe the Communist influence out of the unions, and openly encouraged fascist gangs to take matters into their own hands. The Mayor and Governor made radio speeches that this was not a strike but a "Communist revolution", and 7,000 troops of the National Guard were moved into the San Francisco area. Secretary of Labor Perkins telegraphed that the government would cooperate by deporting all alien Communists. With the stage thus set, on the second and third day of the strike, raids began along the entire Pacific coast by fascist gangs of "vigilantes", followed by police, against the headquarters of the Communist Party, the *Western Worker,* the maritime unions, and homes of workers, where everything was wrecked, workers beaten up and arrested. The printing plant which printed the *Western Worker* was destroyed by fire. About 500 arrests were made, some comrades were charged with criminal syndicalism carrying heavy penalties, and fourteen workers were held for deportation.

It was not until this reign of terror was well under way, that the labor misleaders in their turn took the offensive. On the third day of the strike, the General Strike Committee voted 207 to 180 to call upon the maritime workers to submit their demands to arbitration, and on the following day the General Strike Committee voted 191 to 176 to call off the general strike. In spite of the terror wave, the close vote in a committee packed with A.F. of L. officials shows how the sentiments of the workers really stood. The street-car men continued their strike for several days. Nevertheless, the intimidation and the sell-out had some effect and a week later the maritime workers, who had continued on strike, voted to submit their demands to arbitration, on condition that the unions of the seamen should be included in the settlement, and refused to go back to work until this was agreed to. This solidarity of the longshoremen with the seamen, and their repeated refusal to settle the strike unless all the strikers were included, was an outstanding feature of the strike, and especially significant because in the

1919 and 1921 strikes, due to the policy of the A.F. of L. leaders, the longshoremen and seamen did not support each other. The strike therefore ended, after more than three months of struggle, as an *organized retreat,* and the unions have forced the employers to negotiate with them on all disputed questions, which is in itself a significant concession in spite of the fact that the betrayal by the labor officials prevented the strike from ending in victory.

What are the lessons and conclusions that can be drawn from the maritime strike and the San Francisco general strike?

1. The working class, after a year and a half of the New Deal, has been aroused to an unprecedented fighting spirit, whereby the smallest action for economic demands calls forth solidarity strikes and protest actions in which the unorganized workers and the unemployed fully participate, developing into general strike actions of a political character. This is evidence of the profound ferment and radicalization rapidly developing among the masses as the illusions in the Roosevelt program are evaporating. It is of the utmost importance that the Party utilize the experiences of the general strike, drawing the necessary conclusions, and widely popularize its lessons among the broadest masses, paying special attention to consolidating and extending its influence among the workers and in the local trade union organizations in San Francisco and other centers of strike struggles. While the Party has correctly answered the cry of the capitalist press about "revolution", by pointing out that the general strike was not a revolution but a struggle in support of the immediate economic demands of the workers, it is also necessary for the Party to draw the necessary political conclusions, and point out the significance of the general strike in the present period in its relation to furthering the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat. The longshoremen's strike, as well as the general strike in San Francisco, has shown that through united front mass struggles, the workers can defeat the employers' moves for company unionism.

2. The main stream of the strike movement for economic demands and against company unions continues to develop in the main *through the reformist unions,* despite the feverish efforts of the A.F. of L. leaders to prevent the strikes, and if the leaders do not succeed in this, they strive by all possible means to retain leadership of the struggle in their hands, and increasingly use the S.P. and renegades (Trotskyites) to behead the strike movement.

3. With the exception of San Francisco, to a lesser extent other Pacific Coast ports, and also Milwaukee where the Party has shown good leadership, we have remained outside of many important strike struggles in the present big strike wave and *did not directly influence the leadership of these strikes.* One of the main reasons for the weak position of the Party in the present strike wave is that we did not see that the tremendous surge for organization and struggle took place, in the main, through the American Federation of Labor. The already-mentioned features of the present strike struggles offer the most favorable opportunities for the Party in placing itself at the head of the strike movement, provided we place the main emphasis on the militant leadership of, and participation in, strike struggles through our activities inside the A.F. of L. unions and among the strikers following reformist leadership. The lessons of San Francisco are that by placing the main emphasis on work within the A.F. of L. and at the same time skilfully organizing the militant actions of the Red union, even though the union is in a weak position, and developing the united front with the A.F. of L. workers and the independent unions, etc., we can achieve important results in organizing and leading strike struggles of the workers, despite the resistance of the A.F. of L. leadership.

4. It is urgent that in the preparations for the coming A.F. of L. convention to be held in October in San Francisco, the scene of the general strike, an opposition program be worked out dealing with the pressing issues raised by the strike movement, and it is essential that we work to have a substantial opposition delegation to the convention and to win positions in the local unions and the Central Labor Councils. At the same time, the Party must foresee and be prepared for any new "Left" maneuvers of the A.F. of L. leadership at the coming convention, in the direction of giving a pretense of more democracy, recognition of the industrial union structure of the Federal locals, etc. The experiences of the joint activities of the ten unions connected with the port of San Francisco show the value and need for continued collaboration and coordination of the activities of these unions following the strike, in order to preserve the gains of the strike and for further struggle. In view of the experiences of the joint strike committee of ten, the Party should advocate the advisability of unification of the existing crafts into one union.

5. The Party, although functioning well under conditions of the terror, issuing the *Western Worker* and leaflets to the troops illegally, and the leadership functioning intact in spite of the raids, under-estimated the extent of the terror and was not prepared for it. Although issuing the slogan of organizing mass self-defense corps, nowhere was any such mass self-defense organized effectively, and working class organizations were not organized for the defense of their headquarters. Even the wrecking of the union strike headquarters was carried through without resistance, although the employers openly spoke

of the attacks in advance. In the centers of the terror wave especially, a broad united front movement for mass self-defense must be organized.

6. A nationwide protest movement against the terror must be carried on, drawing in especially A.F. of L. unions and Socialist Party locals, in defense of workers' organizations. At the same time, it is necessary to utilize the Lundeen resolution introduced into Congress last May, demanding an investigation of the terror, which the Party has not utilized at all.

7. The gains made by the Party during the strike must now be consolidated and further strengthened. It is necessary, first of all: (a), to build the opposition and increase our influence in the I.L.A., and to organize opposition groups in every local of the A.F. of L., also with the aim of building up an opposition within the Central Trades and Labor Council; (b), to build up the Marine Workers Industrial Union amongst the seamen, and to establish close united front connections with the reformist seamen's union and the building up of opposition groups there. On the basis of joint activities of the M.W.I.U., I.L.A., and reformist seamen's union, to advocate the formation of a local federated body of these unions; (c) to increase and consolidate the political influence gained by the Party during the strike, it is necessary to increase the circulation of the *Western Worker* and establish it as a mass paper on the West Coast; (d), to take the utmost advantage of the present favorable opportunities to build the Party in California into a mass Party by bold recruitment. It is most urgent to overcome the fluctuation of the Party there, which is expressed in the present alarming situation of a decline of membership in face of the large recruitment.

* * *

Finally, a campaign must be organized against the arbitration legislation, for the repeal of the Labor Disputes Act, and in support of the workers' demands now in the hands of the arbitration boards, backed up by the sending of workers' delegations and resolutions demanding the acceptance of the workers' demands.

The San Francisco general strike, and the movements for local general strikes in other centers throughout the country, bear eloquent testimony to the correctness of the estimation given by the Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., and particularly of the point indicating the inevitability of economic strikes more and more interweaving with the mass political strike. The historic significance of the San Francisco general strike will leave its imprint on the future development of still greater class battles during the approaching second round of revolutions and wars. The Party must see to it that these lessons are made the property of the whole working class.

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NOTES ON THE STRIKE WAVE IN THE U. S.

By SAM BROWN

WHAT is it that best characterizes the present strike wave in the U.S.A.? It is the movement for local general strikes. The demand for the calling of local general strikes reveals the growing *political* character of the present strike wave in the struggle for *economic* demands, in the struggle for union recognition and against the military fascist-like terror of the strike-breaking apparatus of the government. The local general strike movement is in many respects at a high point, which shows the difference between the first strike wave which began last year and the present strike wave which began in May of this year. In the first strike wave the workers in their surge for organization and strike struggles were held back by the Roosevelt New Deal-N.R.A. illusions, and the "right to organization" promises of the American Federation of Labor leadership; in the present strike wave the workers are striking and struggling so heroically because of their growing disillusionment with the N.R.A., and the demagogy of the A.F. of L. leadership.

The historic general strike in San Francisco was part of the local general strike movement. In Toledo, in Minneapolis, in Milwaukee, in Butte, Mont., in Portland and Seattle the workers moved towards local general strikes. In Toledo, Milwaukee, Portland and Seattle, the overwhelming majority of the A.F. of L. local unions actually voted to go out in general solidarity strikes. Yet, in each case the top leaders of the A.F. of L. succeeded in preventing them from doing so. But in one city, in a city upon which all the top forces of the A.F. of L., national and district leadership were concentrated to defeat the outbreak of the general strike, in San Francisco, did the general strike movement materialize and the efforts of the A.F. of L. leaders to prevent it were defeated.

What is the "secret" of the defeat of the general strike movement in the other cities and the success of the general strike movement in San Francisco? The secret of the success of the general strike movement in San Francisco lies in the success of the leadership of the Party in the strike of the longshoremen and in the ability of the Party to defeat the moves which the top leaders of the A.F. of L. made to prevent the outbreak of the general strike. *We can unhesitatingly state that without the leadership of the Party the general strike in San Francisco would not have materialized.*

The lessons of the San Francisco general strike must be fully absorbed not merely by the Party in "general", but by every *individual* member of the Party. The practice, the lessons of our activities in the San Francisco strike are an excellent school for the training of the Party cadres on how to fight for winning leadership by the Party in the present mighty strike struggles in the U.S.A.

What would be the best method of absorbing the positive lessons of the strikes in San Francisco? The best method, we believe, would be to contrast the positive lessons of San Francisco with our failures in the other important local general strike movements. The splendid leadership of the San Francisco Party organization in the development of the general strike (though note must be taken of the serious errors of unity at any price, of legalistic tendencies) can serve as a good example for the role of the District leadership in the present wave of strike struggles.

To begin with we will consider our experience in the Toledo auto parts strike. The heroism of the Toledo workers against the National Guard and martial law are well known. We can justly consider Toledo as the birthplace of the present movement for local general strikes.

The Toledo auto parts workers became organized within the past year in the federal locals of the American Federation of Labor. The first strike of the auto parts workers started on February 23. The A.F. of L. leadership sold out the strike. The workers were very much dissatisfied with the "settlement" of the strike, with the result that on April 13 they restruck against the wishes of the leadership.

The fact that the workers organized in the reformist unions struck despite their leadership does not mean yet that automatically the leadership will fall into our hands or that the workers will themselves spontaneously organize their own strike committees, etc. And during the entire period of the heroic struggle of the Toledo auto workers, the leadership of the strike and of the general strike movement remained in the hands of the A. F. of L. bureaucracy. Why was this possible? Because the Party remained *outside* of the strike movement and was not connected with the workers *inside* the federal locals of the A.F. of L.

Was the Party active in the Toledo situation? Yes, it was. However, it became active after the strike broke out. It could carry on its activities only as an outside force. The leadership of the Party was expressed through the activities of the Unemployment Council on the picket line. Undoubtedly the slogans of the Unemployment Council for mass picketing, for the mass violation of the injunction had an effect on the strikers and the slogans put

forward by the Unemployment Council were in many respects adopted by the striking workers as their own. The Unemployment Council also advised the workers to establish strike committees, not to depend upon the A.F. of L. leaders. They called for a united front, etc. However, during the entire course of the strike we completely failed to establish a single small functioning rank-and-file group within any of the federal locals of the A.F. of L. to which the striking workers belonged.

It is, therefore, our absence as an *inside* force which explains why the strike remained in the hands of the leadership of the A.F. of L. despite the unexampled heroism of the Toledo strikers and the sweeping movement for a local general strike (close to 90 locals of the A.F. of L. voted for a general strike in support of the Toledo auto parts workers).

We were successful through our later activities in "capturing" a demonstration which the local A. F. of L. leaders felt compelled to arrange in support of the strike. This shows how our influence was growing. But again the fact that we did not have any contacts, any organized groups within the federal locals amongst the striking auto parts workers, enabled the local bureaucrats to remain in the leadership of the strike and finally succeed in betraying it once more.

Why did we act only as an outside force in the Toledo strike situation? Why did our appeals for the united front and for one union in many respects bear the character of manifesto appeals? The reason for it is that at the very time when the auto parts workers were joining the federal locals of the A.F. of L., we remained *outside of* this movement. We did not from the very outset carry on any activities whatsoever within these newly established federal locals. While the workers were joining the A.F. of L. and the unorganized workers were coming under the influence of the A.F. of L. unions, we were only building the Auto Workers Union. The mass of the workers came under the influence of the federal locals of the A. F. of L. in Toledo and the Auto Workers Union remained, of course, nonexistent as a leading force among the workers. And even after the first strike of February was betrayed, even then we did not develop any activities amongst these workers organized in the A.F. of L. unions. How badly our Party forces were trained to understand the new feature in the situation, the surge of the workers for organization through the A.F. of L., is dramatically shown by the following fact: when 60 striking workers of the auto parts approached our Party Section for leadership, we did not even take the trouble to organize them into a functioning group inside the union and amongst the striking A.F. of L. workers. Only now, since the last strike in Toledo, did we succeed in organizing an opposition group of about 20 workers!

We stated that the reason we did not *directly* influence the course of the general strike movement in Toledo is because we remained an outside force. When we say that, it must be stated clearly that the reason for it lies in the fact that at the very time when the workers were moving en masse towards the A.F. of L. federal locals we did not participate in this movement. We remained outside of the A.F. of L. unions up to the very outbreak of the heroic Toledo strike. Here lies the key to the understanding of the outcome of the Toledo strike situation and the failure to establish our leadership amongst the heroic striking Toledo workers.

The general strike in San Francisco broke out in support of the striking longshoremen belonging to the International Longshoremen's Association, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. All during the strike of the San Francisco longshoremen, which began on May 9, we were *inside* the union working *amongst* the striking workers, urging them to build their own strike committees, etc. Indeed, it was a daily combat between the forces inside the union under the influence of the Party and the strikebreaking top leaders of the A.F. of L. Our presence *within* the A.F. of L. union resulted in the establishment of a rank-and-file strike committee which took the strike out of the hands of the top leaders of the A.F. of L.

But we will not be in a position to really understand our success, our ability to establish leadership in the strike situation in San Francisco, unless we mention this most important fact: namely, that last year when the movement for organization developed amongst the San Francisco longshoremen this movement for organization took place through the American Federation of Labor. We did not isolate ourselves from this movement. *We actively participated in the building of the San Francisco local of the I.L.A. affiliated to the A.F. of L.* It is this fact which established us as the inside force within the A.F. of L. union. It is this fact which enabled us to become a deciding factor in the calling of the longshoremen's strike and establishing our influence and leadership amongst the striking longshoremen. (It is necessary to note that the Marine Workers Industrial Union, through its united front activities, was a leading force in calling out on strike the seamen organized in the reformist seamen's union, and played a strategic role in the formation of the united front committee of 50 representing the 10 A.F. of L. unions in the port of San Francisco.)

The outbreak of the general strike in San Francisco can really be traced back to our participation with the workers in the building of the A.F. of L.

local of the I.L.A. This fact cannot be overemphasized.

It is the militant leadership of the longshoremen's strike which aroused and inspired the desire for victory on the part of all the port workers of San Francisco. It is this spirit which led to the outbreak of the general strike. *Thus we see that concentration and the winning of leadership in one strategic point as the longshoremen's strike, can indeed become the starting point for such a sweeping movement as the general strike in San Francisco was.*

Let us now briefly consider the experiences of the two threatening national strikes, such as in the steel and auto industries.

In both of these industries, the workers, through their A.F. of L. unions, were clamoring for a general strike. The National Convention of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers (A.A.) officially went on record for a national strike. The workers had so little faith in the old leadership of the A.A., that a special opposition committee of ten was elected to supervise the organization of the calling of the general steel strike. It is very instructive to note that the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union, through its proper united front approach to the locals of the A.A., succeeded in developing sentiment for the general strike and for united action between the A.F. of L. union and the S.M.W.I.U. to organize and lead the general steel strike. Yet we must record that Green and the leaders of the A.A. succeeded with comparative ease in calling off the general strike and bringing the leaders of the Committee of Ten to their knees in complete surrender.

The indignation amongst the steel workers against the calling off of the general strike was quite great, yet not a single local of steel workers went out on strike on the set date. Here again we must say that the main reason for the complete success of Green (president of the A.F. of L.), Mike Tighe (president of the A.A.), and the Committee of Ten in calling off the general strike without any action on the part of the steel workers is due to the fact that there was not a single organized functioning opposition group within a single local of the A.A. or within a single steel plant.

The very good beginning of the united front activities of the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union increased our influence amongst the workers, but it did not succeed in establishing us as an *inside* force in the A.F. of L. union of the steel workers. And the influence of the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union was not strong enough to call out the steel workers in a single important plant which could become the signal for the workers in other steel plants, belonging to the A.A., to come out in a general strike. Here we may contrast again with the San Francisco situation. Had we in the steel industry succeeded, either through our work within the A.A. or through the establishment of the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union as a mass local in a strategic steel mill, we could have called out a local steel strike which would have worked against the strike-breaking methods and leadership of Green and Tighe.

In the threatened general auto strike of last March, the Auto Workers Union warned the workers of the betrayal of Green and Collins (national organizer of the federal locals in the auto industry). When the A.F. of L., in connivance with Roosevelt last March, called off the general auto strike in Detroit, the Auto Workers Union told the workers to strike, but this call to strike was like a call in the wilderness. This was so because in not a single one of the federal locals of the auto industry in Detroit, did we have a single organized opposition group, and certainly the Auto Workers Union did not have a mass local in a single auto plant that could call the workers out on strike. The result was that despite the strong urge for strike struggle displayed on the part of the auto workers, no strike in an auto plant took place which could have become the signal for the development of the auto strike despite Green and Collins. Here again the contrast between the development of the San Francisco strike situation and the threatened general strike in auto is quite obvious.

* * *

It is not sufficient merely to describe and contrast the various strike situations in order to draw all the implications and lessons from them. It is necessary to place our fingers on the main source of the reason for our remaining *outside* of the key strike situations and partly in the Milwaukee car-men strike. In order to understand the root of our errors it is necessary to go back to the conditions and background of the surge for organization and strike struggles which began at the end of the Hoover regime and on the eve of the Roosevelt inauguration.

It is well to recall that already at the end of 1932, particularly at the beginning of 1933, we had the first beginnings of a strike wave in auto, the steel strike in Warren, strikes in textile and coal. In the auto strike of 1933 it was the Auto Workers Union which led these struggles. The Warren steel strike and even more so the local textile and coal strikes, were under our influence. The urge for organization and strike struggle began to show symptoms of a real mass character even before Roosevelt came into office. It is essential to bear this in mind. Section 7a (with its demagogy about the right to organize) in the N.R.A. monopoly structure was not an accidental one. It was designed to head off the movement for organization and strike struggles.

For this purpose the A.F. of L. leadership and organizations were actively brought into the picture. It was not only because of the fear of organization generally, but specifically because of the fear of our leadership that the A.F. of L. leadership was, at the beginning of the N.R.A. given official recognition and status and at the same time the Roosevelt administration with the support of the A.F. of L. leaders was sponsoring company unions. The recent growth of company unions emphasizes the need of our struggle against company unionism and our work *inside* the company unions.

We clearly recognized the nature of the N.R.A. and the ultimate purpose of Section 7a. We did not however, appreciate sufficiently the effects of the social demagogy of Section 7a upon the mass of the rising workers. We particularly failed to understand the active organization role of the A.F. of L. leadership. In many respects we still considered ourselves as having the monopoly amongst the unorganized workers. We clung to old conceptions that the A.F. of L. leaders will never organize the unorganized, that they will never organize the unskilled and will not "lead" strikes. But what actually did take place? The A.F. of L. leaders began a widespread campaign to organize the unskilled and unorganized and to strengthen their unions. To be sure, "they got more than they wanted". The pentup desire of the American workers in the basic industries for organization and struggle swept through the old structure of the A.F. of L. organization and its international unions.

Let us consider a few examples.

In the prosperity days, the 1927 Convention of the A.F. of L. in Detroit decided to launch a campaign to organize the auto workers. The A.F. of L. leaders wanted to bargain with the open shop heads of the auto industry. At that time they were not even asked to sit at the same table. And the A.F. of L. leaders did not raise a finger to organize the workers in the auto industry. Following the auto strikes under our leadership at the beginning of 1933 and particularly since the inauguration of the N.R.A., the A.F. of L. began to organize the unorganized, the unskilled workers, in the auto industry on the basis of federal locals. In a short period, over a hundred locals in more than 10 states were built in the auto industry. Previous to that, excepting in a few old craft locals, the A.F. of L. was nonexistent in the auto industry. The field had been completely open to us.

Let us take another industry connected with auto, the rubber industry. For years we have tried to organize the rubber workers. In fact as far back as 1926-27, we established a union in Akron. It completely escaped our notice, however, that within the last year the A.F. of L. organized a number of federal locals in the rubber industry with a reported total membership of 50,000.

Federal locals of the A.F. of L. were also established in such highly trustified industries as the Mellon aluminum trust, and aviation.

It is also very significant that a number of the oldest international unions in the A.F. of L., which some were too quick to pronounce to be dead or at best a union of a small group of highly skilled workers, have tremendously increased their membership in the last year. These revived unions have in their ranks large sections of the unskilled workers in the trustified industries. For example, the Amalgamated Iron, Steel and Tin Workers. By the middle of 1933 the membership of this union had fallen to 4,700. Of these fewer than 3,000 were paying their dues. But by the end of 1933, 125 new lodges sprang up and its membership increased from 4,700 to a claimed membership of 60,000. Such was the growth of this A.F. of L. union which is 58 years old!

1932 was a very low point in the growth of the United Mine Workers of America. Perhaps nothing demonstrated more dramatically the shift in the ranks of the American workers than the growth of the U.M.W.A. in the past year and the strike of the 100,000 coal miners organized in this union. The National Miners Union virtually ceased to exist in this period.

What was the attitude of our Party at the time of this growth of the A.F. of L. unions, at a time when the mass of the workers in the basic industries outside of the A.F. of L. unions were coming under the influence and leadership of the A.F. of L. unions? It must be stated that we did not sufficiently understand nor react to this turn and change. At the very time when literally tens of thousands of workers flocked into the locals of the U.M.W.A., an outstanding leader of the National Miners Union declared that the U.M.W.A. was in "a state of collapse". In the midst of the organization drive of the auto industry, on the very eve of the threatened general auto strike, a leader of the Auto Workers Union declared "that the A.F. of L. will never organize the unorganized workers in the auto industry". These statements were made when actually both the National Miners Union and the Auto Workers Union were in "a state of collapse".

Is it not clear that such an attitude, in a period of such intense surge for organization amongst the workers taking place through the A.F. of L. revealed sectarianism and isolation from the basic sections of the working class? Such an attitude showed how badly we knew the moods of the masses and the actual state of conditions amongst the workers. This sectarian attitude was further deepened by the inability to grasp the political meaning of the "sud-

den" activity and interest of the A.F. of L. in organizing the unskilled workers in the basic industries. These comrades failed to understand that fearing the growth of our influence, the A.F. of L. leaders, with the sanction of the Roosevelt administration, placed themselves at the head of the organization of the American workers, in order to behead their struggles.

It is true that for the past year the Party has considerably improved its work in the A.F. of L. unions. But in some respects our work within the A.F. of L. unions was approached in too narrow a sense. The work was mainly considered from the viewpoint of working within the old A.F. of L. unions, mainly confined to the building trades locals. We did not sufficiently see the broader meaning of our work within the A.F. of L., that is, to participate in the formation of the new federal locals of the A.F. of L. and to become a part of the organization wave of the workers, which *in the main took place through the channels of the A.F. of L.*

Our position in the auto industry would have been much stronger and we could have played a decisive part in the auto strike if we had participated in the formation of the federal locals in those plants where the Auto Workers Union had no mass base. The same is true in mining, in certain branches of the metal industry, and certainly in such industries as rubber and aluminum, where the Red unions did not even have any contacts.

In the strike struggles in mining and automobile, we have issued correct slogans to the workers to build their own rank-and-file strike committees, to take the strike into their own hands, to spread the strike, etc. We have continually addressed to them united front appeals for the building of one union in the industry. Our appeals were received by the workers sympathetically in many instances, but they had not effect insofar as the actual organization and leadership in the strike struggles were concerned. The reason for this is that we remained outside of the unions in which the workers were organized, namely, the A.F. of L. unions. Would not our position in the auto industry be much stronger if we would call upon our followers, in such plants where the Auto Workers Union has no mass basis, to join and participate in the life and activities of the federal locals of the A. F. of L. (without liquidating the Auto Workers Union in such plants where it is stronger than the federal locals)?

If we compare the Toledo strike, the Minneapolis and other strikes with the San Francisco strike, we see that in San Francisco we were successful mainly because we participated in the formation of the local unions to which the workers showed an urge to belong, *i.e.*, to the A.F. of L., thus enabling us to be inside and with the workers, while, in the other strike situation, we remained aloof and isolated from the main trend of the workers, which was towards the A.F. of L.

Our experiences in the recent strikes also show that those of the Red industrial unions which correctly applied the policy of the united front and established connections with the workers in the A.F. of L. unions in their respective industries can play an increasingly leading role in strike struggles. This is true of the role played by the Marine Workers Industrial Union in the San Francisco strike situation and by the united front opposition activities, led by the Steel and Metal Workers Union. The partial growth of the above-mentioned two Red unions should be very instructive to the other industrial unions, particularly the National Textile Workers Union and the Auto Workers Union.

The outstanding lessons of the contrast between our leadership in the San Francisco strike situation, and our failure to establish leadership of the other key strike situations are:

1. With the exception of San Francisco, and, to a lesser extent, Milwaukee and Pacific Coast ports where the Party has shown good leadership, we have remained outside of many important strike struggles in the present strike wave, and did not *directly* influence the leadership of these strikes. What is one of the main reasons for the weak position of the Party in the present strike wave? It is the fact that we did not see that the tremendous surge for organization and struggle took place, in the main, through the American Federation of Labor (noting at the same time the development and partial growth of the independent unions and the T.U.U.L.). The present strike struggles offer the most favorable opportunities for placing ourselves at the head of the strike movement. This can be accomplished provided we put the main emphasis on the militant leadership of, and participation in, strike struggles through activities inside the A.F. of L. unions and among the strikers following reformist leadership. The lessons of San Francisco are that, by putting the main emphasis on work within the A.F. of L. and at the same time skilfully organizing the militant actions of the Red union, even though the union is in a weak position, and developing the united front with the A.F. of L. workers in independent unions, etc., we can achieve important results in organizing and leading strike struggles of the workers despite the resistance of the A.F. of L. leadership.

2. The main stream of the strike movement continues to develop through the reformist unions. This takes place despite the feverish efforts of the A.F. of L. leaders to prevent strikes, and if the leaders do not succeed in this, they strive by all possible means to retain leadership of the struggle in

their hands, and increasingly use the Socialist Party and renegades to behead the strike movement.

* * *

The movement for local general strikes emphasizes the importance of the work within every single local of the A.F. of L. labor unions. It is necessary to consciously strive to gain strategic offices and positions in the local unions. In the recent wave of local general strikes we have seen the increased role and importance of the Central Trades and Labor Councils. Through the control of the Central Trades and Labor Councils, the top leaders of the A.F. of L. succeed, by their maneuvers, by their appointing of so-called labor strategy committees, in breaking the general strike movements. The opposition groups within the A.F. of L. must strive with all possible means, through winning leadership of the locals of the A. F. of L., also to gain admittance into the Central Trades and Labor Councils.

The next national convention of the A. F. of L., which is scheduled to take place in October, strangely enough will be held in San Francisco, the city of the recent general strike. Already the leaders of the A.F. of L. are announcing in the press that at the A.F. of L. convention they will start a drive against violent tactics within the A.F. of L. and against the Reds. The fire is particularly directed against the federal locals.

At the last national convention of the A.F. of L. only one opposition delegate was present. Would it not be a serious reflection on the work of the Party in the present strike wave and in organizing the rank-and-file revolt within the A.F. of L. unions, if at the San Francisco convention of the A.F. of L., there is not present a large group of opposition delegates? The improvement of our work within the A.F. of L., a broader political understanding of our work in the A.F. of L. at the present time, will in some respect be judged by the presence of opposition delegates at the San Francisco Convention of the A.F. of L.

* * *

The present strike wave in the United States offers a most favorable opportunity for our Party to break its "historic" isolation from the basic sections of the American proletariat. Already the Eighth Convention of our Party has shown that we are coming closer to the basic sections of the American proletariat. Our leadership in the San Francisco strike, our united front activities in the steel mills, led by the S.M.W.I.U., have shown that the Party is learning in practice how to become the mass leader of the American proletariat. To the extent that we absorb the positive lessons of the general strike in San Francisco, to the extent that we learn from our basic mistakes in the other strike situations, to that extent we will become the deciding factor in the present strike wave in the United States. It is through our leadership in the present strike wave in the United States that we can really take the step which will help us put an end to our isolation from the basic sections of the American proletariat.

The self-critical spirit in which our Party is examining its shortcomings and successes in the present strike wave promises that the Party is on the road towards really becoming the mass Party of the American proletariat.

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WE ARE FOR THE UNITED FRONT

By V. CHEMADANOV,

(*Secretary of the Young Communist International.*)

AT the basis of the program of the Young Communist International there is the task of *rallying and mobilizing* the broad masses of the toiling youth for the *struggle* for their own economic and political interests.

The Y.C.I. tries to unite the youth *in the struggle* for their interests, in the struggle for the *violent overthrow* of the domination of the bourgeoisie, and for the establishment of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, because without this it is impossible to construct classless socialist society.

These principles of *revolutionary* class struggle are beginning to triumph more and more over the principles of the peaceful reformist transition from capitalism to socialism, and are winning an ever larger number of adherents among the working class and toiling youth.

The class struggle is more and more laying bare the *irreconcilable* contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie.

The question facing young workers, toilers and unemployed today with special intensity is: *for* bourgeois democracy and therefore for fascism as well or *for* the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Soviet Power, the power of the working class which carries out its dictatorship in alliance with the toiling peasants, and consequently for socialism as well.

Stern reality is compelling very many of those who used to argue about "democracy in general" and "dictatorship in general" to come down to earth from the cloudy heights of their above-class position.

And it seems strange, to say the least, that Frederick Adler at the Prague Congress *advises* the socialist youth to find a middle path between democracy (*i.e.*, bourgeoisie democracy—V.C.) and dictatorship (*i.e.*, the dictatorship of the proletariat—V.C.).

For the youth the words of Lenin are becoming ever more clear, that anyone who

> "*. . . has not understood from his reading of Marx that in capitalist society at every intense moment, at every serious conflict of classes, what is possible is either the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, has understood nothing of the teaching of Marx in the sphere of either economics or politics.*"

And such a person cannot give advice to the youth and be their organizer and leader in the struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Faced with the menace of the proletarian revolution, the bourgeoisie are striving to consolidate their shaken positions, are preparing for new imperialist wars and in an ever-increasing number of countries are passing to the establishment of open bloody fascist dictatorships. With brutal hatred they hurl themselves against the workers and the revolutionary organizations of the youth, and by means of violence, terror and hunger drive the youth into forced labor camps, and into fascist and militarized organizations.

With the help of the entire State apparatus, schools, art, the press, the cinema, and radio, they are increasingly inflaming the more sordid chauvinist and nationalist sentiments among the youth.

The chief task facing every youth organization which considers itself to be revolutionary is to ensure that the youth discards the chains of slavish bourgeois ideology, and unites in the struggle against exploitation and oppression.

At the present time when the world is "approaching closely to a new round of wars and revolutions", every youth organization which is not reactionary must take up a definite position in the class struggle and give a clear, plain and unequivocal reply to the question of its attitude to the establishment of the united front of the toiling youth. The position of the Y.C.L. on this question is clear. However, to achieve greater clarity we are prepared to express our opinion on the united front of the youth once more. At the same time we want to put before the *socialist* youth the question as to *what barriers* separate them from the Communist youth and what prevents them from struggling alongside the Communist youth and the Communist organizations for the interests of the youth, against fascism and war, and for socialism.

WE ARE THE INITIATORS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNITED FRONT

It is not difficult to prove this by facts taken from the struggle for the united front of the Young Communist Leagues in capitalist countries. It is not our fault that the socialist youth organizations in the past did not support our initiative in the way that they are beginning to do today. Neither is it our fault that our united front proposals have repeatedly been rejected on the most varied pretexts.

Some have stated that agreement could only be reached between "international organizations", and, if nothing more, ignored our attempts to establish

the united front. Others barred themselves off in every way from the united front, under the pretext that our initiative and methods of struggle did not presuppose agreement but exclude any possibility of it. They alleged that we were "maneuvering", "attacking", and putting forward "impossible" demands, and called us "splitters", etc.

We will try to examine these "accusations" calmly, in a businesslike manner, without mutual attacks. Before examining how true these "accusations" and "explanations" are, we must apparently speak of the basic principles of the Communist International which are not entirely clear to those who try to accuse us of all kinds of sins.

We have never concealed nor do we now conceal that we struggle by *revolutionary* methods for the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie, because the latter will not hand over power to the working class nor give up exploitation and oppression without a struggle. We struggle for the smallest economic, political, and cultural interests of the youth. We want to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, Soviet Power. What follows from this? It follows that firstly there can be no question on our part of any kind of class collaboration, *i.e.*, of any bloc with the bourgeoisie, and secondly we shall not agree to *unprincipled* unity, for the sake of unity. This is clear. If this is clear, then it becomes plain that the task of establishing the united front of the youth in this struggle and in the name of this struggle arises precisely from our principles of the revolutionary class struggle. We know quite well that there are youth organizations which consider that it is possible to pass from capitalism to socialism without a violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie, without the dictatorship of the proletariat, along some "middle path" between reformism and Bolshevism, and carry on all their work accordingly. Does this mean that we must refuse, even for a time, to carry on a joint struggle with these organizations, against reaction, for the interests of the youth? No. If that were the case we should not be practical politicians but people floating about somewhere up in the clouds, people isolated from the masses.

Our differences in principle cannot serve as a hindrance to the establishment of the united front of the youth *in the interests of the struggle* for their everyday economic and political demands, for their rights, against the capitalist offensive no matter what form it takes, against fascism and war. Dozens of examples of the struggle of the Spanish, Polish, German, Czechoslovakian and other Communist Leagues, show that they are not only ready to establish a united front with the youth, both in the struggle for their everyday economic interests and in the struggle against fascism and war, but are the *initiators in this regard.*

"But still you look on the united front as a maneuver", we are sometimes told. But when they say this, when they accuse us of not struggling for the united front, they forget to bring forward the facts to prove this. They forget to mention the time and place, the country, the town, the factory, the forced labor camp or university, where we rejected a proposal for a united front, or where our cunning "maneuvers" could be observed.

It is obvious for us that the decisive word in the oncoming class battles against fascism, and in the war for socialism, belongs to the proletariat and toiling masses and that reaction can only be resisted and victory achieved on the basis of their unity. It is also clear to us that the united front cannot be established by "maneuvers". The united front can only be established and hammered out in the struggle against capitalism. We also know that when people talk about our "maneuvers", they have in view primarily, our tactics of struggle for the united front *from below.*

HOW SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND THE TACTICS OF THE UNITED FRONT FROM BELOW?

Some people are evidently not quite clear on this question. What lies at the basis of the tactics of the united front from below? At the base of it lies proletarian democracy and *our profound faith in the powers of the working class,* and the toiling youth.

The Y.C.I. develops on the basis of *proletarian* democracy, on the basis of the initiative and the active participation of all its adherents in the struggle of the working class. It is a law for every Communist Youth organization not to wait for "special" instructions from above when it is a question of defending the economic and political interests of the youth, and when it is a question of establishing the united front in the struggle against reaction. It is necessary to act boldly and determinedly, firmly remembering that *the united front is hammered out, and the fate of capitalism decided not in parliaments, not in the offices of various political leaders, but in the factories, on the streets, in the barracks, at the labor exchanges, in the villages, i.e., in the places where the masses are to be found.* What is wrong about this? Where is splitting to be found here? It would be strange and ridiculous if the Y.C.I. were to put the question in any other way. That would mean that when some Communist organization in Germany, China or Argentina, observes how the bourgeoisie doom the toilers to starvation and war, and sees how the fascist gangs try to destroy the best people of the working class, and experiences it all, it would drop its hands and wait until instructions came "from above" as to the necessity of carrying on a struggle, and until permission arrived to

unite the forces of the youth in this struggle. But this is not what happened. *And therein lies our strength* and our ability to preserve and consolidate our organizations in conditions of the fiercest terror and oppression as in Germany, Japan and China. No objection can be made to this. But the "argument" is advanced against us that in our struggle for the united front from below, we not only "attack" the leaders of various organizations with which we want to conduct a joint struggle, but that in general we do not even think it necessary to talk with these leaders. What is true and what is untrue in this statement?

WHOM DO WE ATTACK AND WHOM DO WE EXPOSE?

Our chief task is to expose the essence of fascist bourgeois ideology to the broad masses of the youth, to explain the danger of a new imperialist war, and to explain to the youth what are their interests and what are the tasks facing them. This task is organically linked up with the necessity of proving to the youth that only by establishing the united front and uniting their forces, only by struggle, can they fulfill their aims and the tasks facing them. It is here where we direct our fire, our forces and our energy. In this struggle we come into contact with very many organizations which, it may be, are not reactionary in essence, but which nevertheless weaken the powers of the working class owing to their policy, and consequently weaken the forces of the youth, hinder the establishment of the united front and thus assist the bourgeoisie. Should we expose them, should we expose the treacherous role of those who disrupt the united front of the youth, and should we prevent the youth from making false steps? As a political organization, should we defend and explain the correctness of our principles and tasks, or not?

Let anyone show us a political organization of the youth which does not do this, and which waits until God puts its views into the heart of the youth. As we know, neither the Communist nor the socialist youth organizations rely on this. They carry on polemics between themselves, trying to convince each other of the correctness of their ideas and views, trying, each in his own way, to explain the causes of the split, the origin of difficulties in the path to the establishment of the united front. They try to expose those organizations and those leaders, who, in their opinion, hinder the establishment of the united front.

We are accused of untactfully and grossly attacking the socialist youth organizations and their leaders. Is this so? Cannot we say the same thing (taking at random any social-democratic paper and some speeches) of those who tell us about these attacks? Of course we can. But we say less about this, and not because we are better or worse in our "attacks", of course, but because polemics cannot be toothless, and, what is most important, a polemic cannot be the *chief* obstacle to the establishment of the united front of struggle against fascism and war, for the interests of the toiling youth. Compare the danger of *fascism*, the danger of imperialist *war*, with—a polemic. The mere comparison shows that those who really struggle for the united front, those who *really struggle against fascism and war* will all the easier find a common language, and the question of polemics, of "attacks", will disappear by itself. Everyone who hinders or disrupts the united front will have to be most mercilessly exposed before the masses.

ARE WE AGAINST NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE SOCIALIST YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS?

We can say directly *no*, we are not. Then what negotiations do we oppose and what negotiations do we not desire to carry on? This is the question to which we must give a clear answer. We are against negotiations which try to put something in the place of the real struggle for the interests of the youth. We are for the united front in the struggle and not in the office. We consider it inadvisable to carry on negotiations for the sake of negotiations, for the sake of polemics and empty talk. We are for negotiations of which the basic masses are kept informed, which affect them, we are for negotiations which are begun not for the sake of maneuvers but for the sake of getting things done and which help to remove the obstacles in the path towards the establishment of the united front. Have we shown initiative in this respect? Have the Communist youth organizations called on the leaders of the socialist organizations to establish a united front? Yes, time after time! We take the liberty of quoting facts, and let no one be offended if these facts are not entirely to their taste. In the spring of 1933, the Executive Committee of the Y.C.I., in calling upon the toiling youth of the entire world to struggle against the fascist danger, and in defense of the German proletariat, recommended all Sections of the Y.C.I. to appeal to the *leaders* of the socialist youth organizations to set up a united front.

In its appeal, the E.C. of the Y.C.I. did not put forward inacceptable conditions, did not make any attacks, but put the question as follows:

> "In view of the conditions laid down by the Communist International as conditions which reflect the will of the working class, the E.C. Y.C.I. recommends the Sections to put the following points as the basis of their agreement:
>
> "1. The Y.C.L.'ers and members of the social-

democratic youth organizations immediately begin to organize and operate the resistance of the youth to the attacks of fascism and reaction on the political, trade union, cultural, cooperative, sporting and other organizations of the workers and the working youth, on the revolutionary working class and youth press, on freedom of assembly, demonstrations and strikes, on the unfettered existence of the organizations of the working youth. They organize joint resistance to the armed attacks of the fascist gangs, by holding mass political strikes; they proceed to participate actively in the formation of committees of action in the factories, labor exchanges, working class areas, and to form workers' defense detachments.

"2. The Y.C.L.'ers and members of the social-democratic youth organizations immediately proceed to organize the protest of the workers and the youth, by meetings, demonstrations and strikes against any reduction of wages, against the worsening of the conditions of labor, against attacks on social insurance, against reducing or depriving the unemployed of relief, for assistance and relief for the unemployed youth, against dismissals from the factories, against the closing of schools, against the exploitation, militarization and fascization of the youth in the forced labor camps, for the payment of the youth according to the wage scale and the expulsion of officers and fascist instructors from the camps, against any encroachment on the electoral or other political rights of the youth.

"3. When accepting these conditions and carrying them into practice, the E.C. Y.C.I., following the Communist International, considers it possible to recommend the Y.C.L. organizations also to give up attacks on the social-democratic mass organizations of the youth during the joint struggle against the offensive of capital and the fascists."

In accordance with this, the Sections of the Y.C.I. appealed to the leaders of the young socialist organizations. What was the reply? The socialist organizations either did not reply at all or simply prohibited the lower organizations of the socialist youth from entering into negotiations with the Y.C.L. Some organizations explained their action by stating that the Communist organizations were weak, and therefore there was no point in talking to them about the united front; others referred to the decisions of the Prague Congress of Socialist Youth in which it states that the united front can only be reached by "international associations" coming to terms with each other.

I could mention countries where our proposals for the united front have been repeatedly rejected in this way, although agreement has been reached in many of the lower organizations. But the main point now is to give a clear reply to the basic question—*do the conditions now exist for establishing the united front, or do they not?*

THE UNITED FRONT CAN AND MUST BE ESTABLISHED

We shall give some facts which show more convincingly than words that *there are no insurmountable barriers to the establishment of the united front.*

Last year the I.L.P. Guild of Youth in Great Britain sent a letter to the Executive Committee of the Y.C.I., proposing to begin negotiations on the possibility of reaching an agreement. As a result of these negotiations, the barriers which formerly appeared to be insurmountable, fell away, and close contacts have been established between the Guild of Youth and the Y.C.L. in Great Britain. Most of the Guild branches have declared that they are prepared to struggle together with the Y.C.L. as an organization sympathizing with the Y.C.I.

In Austria in the conditions of the sharpening class struggle, the socialist and Communist youth came still nearer together. As in Germany, it has become perfectly clear there that no delay is permissible in the establishment of the united front. Over 2,500 members of the socialist youth joined the Y.C.L., in whole organizations, and came into its ranks to carry on a joint struggle against fascism.

Without making it a compulsory condition of the joint struggle that the young socialists should join the Y.C.L., the Central Committee of the Y.C.L. of Austria has made a special appeal to the revolutionary young socialists on the establishment of the united front.

The C.C. of the Y.C.L. of Austria proposed a *joint* struggle for:

"1. Joint resistance to attacks on our wages and on the law for the protection of the youth. The restoration of the independent apprentice youth sections on a revolutionary basis.

"2. For the further development of military sport organizations as non-party military formations of the youth apart from the Schutzbund for the struggle against the white terror.

"3. The struggle for the payment of labor, and the payment of relief to all the unemployed youth.

"4. Against any worsening of conditions, for the payment of wages in labor service camps according to collective agreements. For better treatment and food.

"5. For the liberation of all proletarian political prisoners.

"6. Against all military preparations and the propaganda of war and armaments. For the defense of the Soviet Union.

"7. Against the fascist education of the proletarian youth and the fascization of sport. For the legalization of workers' sport and of all the other workers' organizations.

"8. For the further development of the "*Rote Falken*" as a revolutionary non-party children's

organization, against chauvinist incitement in the schools.

"9. For jointly celebrating the 20th International Day of Youth (I.Y.D.) on September 1, the traditional day of struggle against chauvinism and war."

Ernst Papenek, the leader of the revolutionary socialist youth of Austria, recently wrote directly to the E.C. of the Y.C.I. In his letter he said:

"Almost everywhere the serious obstacles which have hitherto hindered the joint anti-fascist struggle of the social-democratic and Communist workers have disappeared. In no country with a fascist dictatorship can the proletariat adopt democratic means of struggle. The Marxist workers carry on their struggle by revolutionary means. They strive to overthrow fascism, to establish the revolutionary rule of the working class, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the final aim of which is the achievment of socialist democracy. In the struggle for this aim, for the overthrow of fascism, no one can divide us."

The Executive Committee of the Y.C.I. warmly responded to this letter and stated in its reply that:

"We have always been ready to carry on a united front against the bourgeoisie together with you as with all your organizations. We were and still are ready undoubtedly to carry on negotiations with any youth organization, including the Y.S.I., with a view to preparing for such joint actions, although we have not received such a proposal from the latter.

"We consider the united front action by the working youth to be particularly necessary against fascism and the preparations for imperialist war, against the attack of capital on the working class and especially on the working youth, against militarization and the forced labor of the youth."

The Executive Committee of the Y.C.I. further recommended Ernst Papenek to enter into direct negotiations with the C.C. of the Y.C.L. of Austria, whose proposals on the united front, it seems to us, are fully acceptable and do not contain any attacks. In his reply Ernst Papenek writes:

"We are overjoyed at your telegram of July 6, which, it seems to us, opens the possibility before us of the conduct of joint action on the basis of a non-agression pact.

"We are confident that with mutual good-will to serve the cause of the whole of the proletariat, a united militant front of struggle of the class-conscious working youth will very soon be established.

Yes, and we also express our complete confidence that the negotiations which have been started between the leaders of the Y.C.L. and the revolutionary socialist youth of Austria, will be crowned with success and the united front will be established. But the statement of Ernst Papenek to the effect that "in the struggle for this aim, for the overthrow of fascism, nothing will divide us" will be consolidated by real work and a joint struggle.

In France, the Y.C.L.'ers of Paris, according to *Avanguard* of July 19, decided jointly with the young socialists of the Department of the Seine on the basis of the united front:

". . . to begin a big campaign in the Paris region on the basis of the following slogans:

"1. The disarming and disbanding of the fascist leagues and the arrest of their leaders.

"2. The repeal of the Emergency Decrees and the increase of wages for the youth.

"3. Against the two-year term of military service, against military maneuvers, and against any system of compulsory military training.

"4. Unemployed youth to receive benefits from the unemployment fund immediately on leaving school, professional schools for the young unemployed to be opened up under the control of the trade unions. The abolition of all systems of compulsory labor. During these actions, the struggle will be increased to the maximum degree with a view to saving Thaelmann and Paula Balish and also the arrested anti-fascists."

I could also give the examples of Spain, Poland and other countries. But these examples are sufficient to show that we not only talk about united front but display every initiative in this matter and struggle to bring it about. Is not the enormous striving towards unity which can be observed among the toiling youth sufficient for us to say that the *conditions* for establishing the united front in the struggle against fascism and war, for the economic, political and cultural interests and demands of the youth, already exist?

INTERNATIONAL YOUTH DAY AS A DAY OF UNITY

About 20 years ago, at the height of the imperialist war, a conference of socialist youth organizations was held in the town of Berne. At this conference one of the main questions was that of mobilizing the youth of all countries to unite them in the struggle against the imperialist slaughter. Inspired by the best of desires, the Berne conference of the socialist youth sent out the call:

"Comrades! Socialist Youth organizations of all countries! We call on you to display your unshaken will against and to struggle tirelessly *against militarism, for Socialism*, by powerful demonstrations in all countries. We shall all demon-

strate on the same day, October 3, 1915, at the same hour. Comrades in Copenhagen, Christiana, Stockholm, Paris and Berlin must know that at the time while they are demonstrating for peace and Socialism, their friends in Amsterdam, Vienna, Bucharest, Rome and other cities, are doing the same."

Since then, the revolutionary youth have organized The International Youth Day of struggle against fascism and its inevitable accompaniment—imperialist wars, every year.

This year is the 20th Anniversary of the outbreak of the imperialist war in 1914. This year the revolutionary youth of all countries celebrates International Youth Day on September 1, for the 20th time.

The Executive Committee of the Y.C.I., in its appeal to all the working, unemployed, toiling and peasant youth, to students, soldiers and sailors, calls on them to carry on a joint struggle for the establishment of the united front.

The E.C. of the Y.C.I. says: Let us unite our forces, put a stop to all mutual attacks during this joint struggle, offer desperate resistance to bloody fascism and announce to the world that the present generation does not want to be and will not be cannon-fodder to save the interests of capital. Let us unite for the joint defence of Ernst Thaelmann, Paula Balish, and the other prisoners in the hands of capital. What can divide us in this struggle? What hinders us in establishing agreement?

It is possible that for some of the youth organizations, all these conditions for a joint struggle will not be acceptable. It is possible that they will tell us that our demands are too general in character, that there are divergencies in principle between our methods of struggle against fascism and war, for socialism, and the methods of these organizations.

Well, what of it? In reply to this we propose that the Young Socialist International, the Y.S.I, like any other youth organization, should state clearly and directly *what demands corresponding to the interests of the youth it is ready to fight for jointly with us.* What other methods of joint struggle which correspond to the needs of the struggle against fascism and war and for socialism and which correspond to the defense of the interests of the toiling youth, can they propose to us?

As far as we are concerned, we can openly state that we are ready to support *any* demands and methods of struggle of *any* organization and to struggle jointly with it if these demands correspond to the interests of the working class and the toiling youth and can hasten the victory over the fascist-inclined bourgeoisie who are frantically preparing for a new imperialist war.

Can we reach agreement on this basis? We can and we will fight for this.

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AGAINST PROVOCATEURS—AGAINST SPLITTERS

By OKANO

SINCE May this year the Japanese bourgeois press has been paying much attention to questions of the internal life of the Communist Party of Japan. The hired servants of Japanese imperialism are particularly interested in the way in which the Communist Party of Japan combats provocation. The materials published in the Japanese bourgeois press about the activity of the Communist Party are based mainly on police information. What kind of information do they provide as to the position of the Communist Party?

The bourgeois press states that the Japanese police were able to strike heavy blows at the Communist Party at the end of 1932. At the beginning of 1933, it is alleged, Yamomoto Masami was sent from Moscow to Japan by the Comintern and in a short time he succeeded in restoring the Party organizations and carrying on a large amount of Communist work both inside the country and at the front. The police were soon able to get track of this illegal activity and succeeded in arresting Yamomoto himself. After this, according to the statements of the police, discord is alleged to have arisen in the ranks of the Communist Party and an internal struggle commenced. The Central Committee which was formed after the arrest of Yamomoto studied the circumstances under which the latest arrests had taken place and came to the conclusion that they were to be mainly explained by the fact that provocateurs had succeeded in stretching their tentacles into the apparatus of the Party. In view of the tremendous harm being done to the Party by provocation, the C.C. of the Communist Party of Japan decided to begin a merciless struggle against it. With this objective in view, great ideological activity was carried on in the Party. In addition, it is alleged that a special militant self-defense group was formed, attached to the C.C., whose special function was to discover provocateurs and to do away with them. The Japanese bourgeois papers, especially those most closely connected with the police, are filled with detailed descriptions of the activity of this Party self-defense group. The statement is made that more than 10 people were condemned to death by this group, that some of these have already been killed, while others have been only able to save their lives thanks to the prompt interference of the police. As a result, it is alleged, suspicions have arisen inside the C.C. and even among the members of the defense group, to the effect that there are police agents-provocateurs in this small circle of Party activists and that they defend their companions—exposed provocateurs—whom they help to hide from revolutionary vengeance. After the first provocateurs had been murdered, the police proceeded to carry out mass arrests, and by May this year, they arrested 736 persons allegedly in connection with the activity of the defense group. In connection with the arrests, as reported in the bourgeois papers which base themselves on police materials, dissatisfaction is alleged to have begun to appear inside the Communist Party of Japan with the activity of the self-defense group, and the C.C. which directs it.

On June 7, 1934, an article was published in the newspaper *Tokyo Asaki,* under the title "The Japanese Communist Party Is Approaching a Split". This article states that on May 25, a joint statement was published of a group of supporters of a conference of cells, signed on behalf of the Kansai District Committee of the Party, of a conference and delegates of cells in the Koto District of Tokyo, of the fraction of the Koita District Council of the Dzenkio,* of the fraction of the C.C. of the Dzeikai,† of the fraction in Niahon Serenmei Kumiai Remei,‡ and of a group of organizers of the Tiugokow District. In this statement, if we are to believe the press, information is given regarding the formation of an organizational committee for the calling of an all-Japanese delegate Party conference. The *Tokyo Asaki* explains the formation of this organizational committee as an expression of the lack of faith of the lower Party organizations in the C.C. because these lower organizations allegedly consider that the C.C. is in the hands of the provocateurs. The organizational committee according to the *Tokyo Asaki* allegedly sets itself the task of winning the C.C. away from the provocateurs. The newspaper continues that the C.C., on its part, accuses the organization committee of being a tool in the hands of the police, who are in every way trying to hinder and nullify the merciless struggle against provocateurs begun by the C.C.

These flights of fancy of the Japanese police are being distributed all over the country in millions of copies. They are being read by the broad masses of the workers, peasants and toilers in town and village. They are being read by members of the Communist Party of Japan who, in underground conditions, have no direct connection with the C.C. of the Party and who are thus being led astray by incor-

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* Revolutionary trade unions.

† Peasant union.

‡ Japanese Federation of Trade Unions (reformist).

rect information regarding the position in the C.C. What is the matter, what does the Japanese bourgeois press wish to achieve by handing out police information regarding the position in the Communist Party? These questions must be very carefully examined. This information is undoubtedly of no chance character.

The Japanese Government systematically and intentionally gives detailed information to the bourgeois press regarding the situation in the Communist Party of Japan, and tries to depict the activity of the Communists in such a manner as to frighten away the workers and peasants. By publishing such information regarding the situation in the Communist Party, the police are pursuing their usual aims of (a), causing confusion in the Party, and among the working and peasant masses, by giving false information about the Communist Party, and (b), through false information, disorganizing the work of the Party and discrediting the Party in the eyes of the masses. This is the first thing which must be borne in mind by all toilers in Japan and other countries when they read the information in the Japanese press regarding the situation in the C.P. of Japan.

Do the Japanese police make use of provocation? There is no need to prove this. Without a doubt they use provocation just as do the police in other capitalist States. It may be stated that provocation is the usual weapon used by the Japanese police in its struggle against the Communist Party. The C.C. of the Communist Party published a manifesto to all Party members and to all the workers and peasants of Japan, in which it concretely and in detail exposed the provocative methods used by the Japanese police. In this manifesto, for example, attention is drawn to the following methods of police provocation:

1. The police make use of factional struggle by inflaming existing disagreements, and they participate in anti-Party factional groups. The manifesto says, "Be vigilant! Study the decisions of the Party collectively, and ensure iron Party discipline by carrying out Party decisions without question".

2. The police egg on the Party organizations and individual activists to take the path of adventurism, *e.g.*, the robbery of a bank in Omeri, etc.

3. Through provocateurs who penetrate into the Party, the police are able to remove the best activists and at the same time do everything possible to hinder the carrying out of Party decisions, as was the case in 1932 when provocateurs succeeded in penetrating into the finance department of the C.C. and into the circulation department of the newspaper *Sekki*.

4. Provocateurs often come forward as those who "defend" the correct line of the Comintern against deviations in the work of the C.C., and owing to their boldness and impudence they are able to deceive some comrades. Sometimes provocateurs are found who have real political "talent".

5. The police often do not for a time react to the reports made by provocateurs, so as to make it possible in this way for the latter the better to worm themselves into the confidence of the Party and to prepare for the more serious destruction of the Party organizations.

In mentioning all these types of work of the provocateurs, the C.C. calls on the Party members and on all workers and peasants

> ". . . in case of arrests, to make a most consistent study of their causes, and at the same time to keep a vigilant watch on suspicious elements who have penetrated into the Party with the help of the political police. Check up most carefully on those who return to the organization after the police have released them, learn to observe people, and carefully check up those whom you appoint to various posts. It is not a matter of getting rid of one or two provocateurs, but of developing an energetic struggle against the system of provocation. Organize the struggle against provocation as a component part of the general revolutionary class struggle for the overthrow of the monarchy."

The analysis made is a correct one and the proposals on the whole are also quite correct. But this does not by any means imply that having issued a manifesto and exposed therein the types and methods of work used by provocateurs, that the Party has thus protected its organizations, including the central bodies, against the penetration of provocateurs. The manifesto of the C.C. of the Communist Party justly points out that no complete guarantee against provocation can be created. The police obtain their provocateurs by the most varied means—by bribery, terrorization, torture, and by sending paid agents into the Party, who play the role of loyal Communists, etc. The harm done by provocateurs to the Communist Party is very great, but it should be borne in mind that owing to their special position, owing to the fact that they have to work at the orders of the police and at the same time give systematic proof to the Party of their good revolutionary work, the provocateurs in some cases do harm to the bourgeoisie.

Examples of this kind are provided by the provocation carried on in various Communist Parties and particularly by the history of the Russian provocateur, Manilovsky. Manilovsky succeeded in making his way into the central apparatus of the Bolshevik Party. Documentary evidence now exists to prove how great was the harm done to the Bolshevik Party by Manilovsky. He betrayed a number of important activists, and informed the police about the inner work of the illegal Bolshevik leading committees, etc. But at the same time there is docu-

into an active general strike, accompanied by mass mentary evidence to prove that in order to keep his post as provocateur, Manilovsky was compelled to carry out various tasks assigned to him by the Party, such as speeches in the State Duma, the collection of money for the illegal Party press, speeches at workers' meetings as a revolutionary Social-Democrat, etc.

In general, history knows no case where provocateurs have been able to stop the revolutionary movement of the masses who are rising to the struggle. This is completely confirmed by the example of the C.P. of Japan. In spite of all cases of provocation in the recent period, the Party is successfully continuing its heroic struggle. The exposure of a police provocateur whose reports have caused the arrest of revolutionaries and their torture in the police dungeons, has always roused great indignation in the ranks of the Party and among the masses of the working class. History knows many cases when provocateurs were killed by the indignant workers. But it should be borne in mind, on the basis of existing revolutionary experience, that the creation of special groups to deal with provocateurs as a method of dealing with provocation may bring elements of disintegration into the Party. Before the seizure of power and before conditions exist for open civil war and for the struggle for power, the Party organizations must as a rule quietly remove from Party activity Party workers who are suspected of being provocateurs.

The entire experience of the revolutionary movement, especially the experience of the Russian Bolsheviks, shows how correct the latter were during the tsarist regime when they sharply condemned individual terror as a method of struggle against the class enemy. The C.C. of the C.P. of Japan has correctly pointed out in its manifesto that it is not a question of removing one or two provocateurs from the list of the living. It is possible to finally put an end to provocateurs only by the victory of the proletarian revolution which will establish the Soviet regime and place the keys to all police secrets into the hands of the victorious working class. The vengeance wreaked on two exposed provocateurs, which took place in Japan, was promptly used by the Japanese police, who tremendously exaggerated these facts, and tried in every possible way to prove that the Japanese Communist Party had entirely adopted the path of mass individual terror in respect to all Party members suspected of provocation. At the same time the police began right and left to arrest hundreds of workers and peasants who were alleged to have had something to do with the "lynching" of the provocateurs, and each of these prisoners was brought to court on "legal" grounds and punished according to the severest clauses of the criminal and military laws.

In the organization committee formed by a number of the lower Party organizations with a view to calling a Party conference, the alleged aim of which is to free the C.C. from provocateurs, there was clearly to be felt the influence of the campaign of the bourgeois press against the Party. The slogan that a Party conference be called of representatives of the lower Party organizations who have not yet fallen under the disintegrating influence of the provocateurs, with a view at this conference to establishing a new C.C. of honest Party members is, of course, easily understandable in such circumstances, although not entirely correct, because the question of the C.C. in an illegal party is by no means such a simple one. The activist in the C.P. of Japan must realize that if there is only a core of good Bolsheviks in the C.C. of the Party, who, despite police difficulties, rally the Party and the working class for the struggle against the bourgeoisie, and against war, the police are very deeply interested in discrediting such a C.C. in the eyes of the Party. On the other hand, the police who evidently have agents in the lower Party organizations, will also try to worm themselves into the preparations for the Party conference. With this object in view they will try to get their people into the organization committee and through them to learn what is being done at the conference, about everything that is being done in the Party, and will also try to penetrate into the C.C. which will be elected at this conference. All this should be foreseen. On the basis of all existing international experience of the struggle against provocation, we should consider that the comrades in the C.C. are right in thinking that the political police will try through their agents to penetrate into the organization committee for calling the Party conference; at the same time the comrades in the lower organizations are right when they raise the question of a further struggle against provocation in the central bodies of the Party. It must be stated outright, without any concealment, that the Communist Party of Japan is now threatened with a split and the disorganization of all its Party work, a position to which it is being egged on by the agents of the police who are artfully utilizing the situation inside the Party. The Party must beat off this police attack at all costs. How can this be done?

First, those comrades who help to sharpen the struggle between the C.C. and the organization committee are objectively playing into the hands of the police, whether they like it or not, and are driving the Party towards a split. All honest Communists, supporters of the C.C. and supporters of the organization committee, must come out in a most decided manner against such a sharpening of inner Party relationship.

Secondly, a small commission should be appointed

from among the members of the C.C. and the organization committee consisting of thoroughly tested comrades who do not arouse suspicion among the supporters of either side. The work of the commission will be to gather all existing materials which accuse individual workers of the C.P. of Japan of provocation, and on the basis of a careful study of all this material, take the necessary organizational steps which will put an end to these mutual accusations and will ensure the harmonious work of the Party in the future. As for the Party conference, it would be useful to call it but only when, as a result of the measures adopted by the commission, mutual attacks have been stopped and conditions for normal Party work have been established. Naturally an all-Japanese Party conference requires careful preparations, and the *entire Party* must participate in this important matter. The place where it is to meet, the manner of electing the delegates, the agenda of the conference etc., are extremely important questions in underground conditions and cannot be solved without serious preparations.

Thirdly, a wide campaign must be carried on against the police-inspired slander in the bourgeois press, which claims that the C.C. has introduced into the Party the system of lynching provocateurs. The real position of the Party in the struggle against provocation, as set out in the above mentioned manifesto of the C.C. to the Party, the workers and the peasants, must be widely popularized. It must be clearly stated that the C. P. of Japan repudiates individual terror as a method of struggle against provocateurs, and, on the contrary, regards the struggle against provocation as a component part of the general revolutionary struggle.

Fourthly, in the immediate future the organizational work of the Party must be decentralized to the greatest possible degree—maximum initiative being allowed to the local and District Party Committees. All efforts must be directed towards organizing the regular issue of the *Sekki* and other central Party literature which give information about the Party line, about its central fighting slogans, and which explain how the slogans should be carried out. Extensive District and factory Party literature must be published by all means to supplement the activity of the central Party press.

Fifthly, the use of legal and semi-legal possibilities must be continued and extended, and work in all the legal and semi-legal workers' organizations must be intensified, especially in the trade unions (Red, reformist, etc.) By a correct combination of illegal methods of Party work with legal and semi-legal methods, the blows of the police terror should be paralyzed, contacts with the masses should be strengthened, the Party activists should be put under the defense of the masses in the factories, in the mass organizations, and in the organs of the united front of struggle (strike committees, etc.). These are the most reliable methods of protecting the Party activists against police terror, while simultaneously consolidating the influence of the Party among the masses.

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THE SITUATION IN GERMANY AND SOME QUESTIONS OF THE UNITED FRONT*

By O. PIATNITSKY

(Concluded from the last issue.)

WHEN COMMUNISTS CAN SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT THE UNITED FRONT

I WISH to touch on only one question here—the question as to what change has taken place in the operation of the united front. What has changed is this: that wherever the Communist Parties have extended their work among the masses to even a slight degree, they have secured certain successes in operating the united front. Those Communists who have increased their influence over the working masses, have thereby exerted pressure on the social-democratic organizations, and helped to bring about the united front even when the leaders of the social-democratic parties have been against the united front of struggle with the Communists and hindered its establishment. This has taken place due to the fact that in broadening their influence, the Communists have established contacts with those strata of the working class on which, hitherto, the social-democratic party has relied. It is these very strata of workers which have exerted pressure on the social-democratic organizations with a view to establishing the united front of struggle, along with the Communists. I wish to confirm this assertion by quoting instances from the experiences of a few parties.

Take France, where the successes of the Communists in operating the united front have been particularly great. Take the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933. At that time a campaign against war was being carried on in France. The Communist Party of France carried on extensive agitation in favor of affiliation to the Amsterdam anti-war movement, into which large numbers of workers, including members of the Socialist Party of France and even whole organizations of this party, were drawn. The Social-Democratic Party offered to commence united front negotiations with the C.P. of France, having in view one aim, namely, to stop this movement. And the C.P.F. took the line which the socialists most desired, namely the line of endless talk about unity and about methods of calling discussion meetings and similar questions, instead of raising the question of the concrete methods to be adopted in carrying out the united front of struggle against the capitalist offensive. By its actions, the Communist Party only helped to stop the process of the passage to the Communist Party of those social-democratic workers who were dissatisfied with the repression directed by the social-democratic leaders towards those who participated in the anti-war movement.

At the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933, the Second International started to talk about a "non-aggression pact" between the Communists and social-democrats, but no concrete proposals regarding joint struggle were made either by the Second International or the parties belonging to it. The social-democratic parties thought of the "non-aggression pact" in the following way: the Communist Parties (who were at that very moment beginning to extend their influence over the masses) should join the united front with all the existing workers' organizations (trade unions, cooperatives, sports, etc.) and parties, and, as they were in a minority, they could be browbeaten. The Communist Parties, according to this view, would moreover be compelled to conform to the decisions of the majority and would have to give up all criticism of social-democracy. And when on March 5, 1933, the Comintern made the concrete proposal to them to begin a joint struggle against fascism and the worsening of the conditions of the workers in each separate country (this just coincided with the coup d'etat in Germany, when the fascists showed their real face), and the Second International in fact rejected this proposal, while all the parties of the Second International, including the French Party, repudiated the united front with the Communist Parties, the masses (even in France) did not react to this event. The masses did not react to the rejection of the united front by the social-democratic parties because they did not see a really wide struggle being carried on by the Communists, and the results which could be obtained by the joint action of the Communists and social-democratic workers.

But take the events in France which took place at the same time as those in Austria, when the C.P. of France succeeded on February 9, 1934, in carrying the majority of the French proletariat with it during the demonstrations which it organized; and when, by joining in the general strike called by the reformists on February 12, 1934, it converted this strike from the "folded arms" strike desired by the reformists

* Speech delivered at a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I., held on July 9 to 10, 1934.

demonstrations. And it was only necessary that the Communist Party show the masses that it was able to fight, and that it was capable of starting this struggle in time, for an immediate change to be observed in the attitude of the social-democratic workers towards it. The united front was established even before formal negotiations were begun between the Communists and the socialists. This took place because the C.P. of France repeatedly warned the French workers that the French bourgeoisie were organizing fascist gangs and that although the Social Party was aware of this, it not only concealed it from the workers but even reassured them with assertions that fascism was impossible in democratic France. On February 6, however, the fascists not only came out on to the streets but overthrew the Daladier government. The majority of the workers in France, including the working class members of the Social-Democratic Party, responded to the call of the Communist Party for street demonstrations on February 9, in spite of the fact that the reformist trade unions called on the workers not to participate in these demonstrations. This compelled the social-democratic organizations, which felt the pressure from below, to abandon their former sabotage of the united front even when the C.C. of their party rejected the united front. The Social-Democratic Party maneuvered. The congress of the Social-Democratic Party proposed to establish a united front with the Communists only on one definite question, and for a short period of time. By this means the socialists wanted to soothe their party members somewhat, and to convince them that they were agreed to and would consent to establishing the united front with the Communists. However, such large social-democratic organizations as that functioning in the Department of the Seine, as well as a number of others, established the united front with the Communists against the will of their C.C. And thereby they exerted pressure on their C.C.

What does this show? It proves that the Communists were able to bring about the united front in France only after they had demonstrated in practice that they are able to struggle and are capable of starting this struggle in time. It was only after this that the call of the C.P.F. met with a wide response. In a short time the Communists made up for all that had been allowed to slip, all their losses since 1920. I do not mean to say by this (and let our French comrades not think so) that the Communists will be able to consolidate their influence without further active work. There are enormous possibilities not only of extending the united front but of consolidating it, which have not as yet been used.

Take Germany before the fascists seized power. Here we have the opposite state of affairs. During the Prussian elections the social-democrats, in order to get votes for their candidate, declared that they would oppose wage cuts in those industries where the collective agreements terminated at that time. A small manifesto was prepared together with the help of the German comrades, in which an appeal was made to all organizations capable of offering resistance, to form a united front of struggle against wage cuts. The leaders of the Communist Party of Germany kept this document hidden away until the end of the Prussian elections, on the ridiculous grounds that its publication during the elections might influence the masses to think that "this is only a Communist maneuver, while this document was of a serious character". This was a great mistake. What did the publication of this document show? Firstly, the worker in the mills and factories began to discuss this Communist Party document in detail. This was the first document for a number of years in which the Party proposed the organization of a united front to all working class organizations desirous of struggling against wage cuts when new collective agreements were being made in certain branches of industry. And if the document did not lead to the desired results, it was only because it was late in being published.

Let us see what were the tactics of the C.P. of Germany on July 20, 1932. When the Communist Party called on the Social-Democratic Party and the reformist trade unions to undertake joint action to the point of a general strike when Papen dissolved the social-democratic government of Prussia, it made a bold and correct step. We know that the reformists refused to undertake this struggle. The inability of the Communists to begin this struggle themselves on July 20, 1932 and to draw even part of the proletariat into it and thereby to show that the Communists were really able to fight and that they could rally the workers to this struggle, had a depressing effect on the workers. The proposal made by the C.P. of Germany to the Social-Democratic Party and the reformist trade unions on January 30, 1933—to act in a united front against the fascist dictatorship which had only just seized power—was, of course, important for the further struggle of the C.P. The fact, however, that after the call to mass strike action on July 20 and January 30, the C.P.G. was unable to rouse the masses, determined the attitude of the workers to the proposal made by the C.P.G. in March, 1933 to the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party and the reformist trade unions to undertake joint action against the fascists, a proposal to which the reformists did not reply, and to which the workers did not react at all.

The reason why the C.P.G. was unable to rouse the workers to the strike on July 20, 1932, January

30, 1933 and March 5, 1933, is well known. The great mistake made by the Communists was that they carried on insufficiently energetic mass work, work in the trade unions and in the factories. The one thing is connected with the other. The poor mass work of the Communist Party of Germany made it impossible for the Party to carry the masses with it despite the reformists, and this helped towards the fact that the call of the C.P.G. on January 30 and March 5, 1933, at the decisive moment in the struggle against fascism, met with an insignificant response.

And now take Austria. The Communist Party of Austria was of small magnitude as compared with the giant which the Social-Democratic Party was. The social-democrats mocked at the Austrian Communists when the latter proposed the united front. But the conduct of the Communists during the February events, when, without agreeing with the methods of struggle of the social-democrats, they fought side by side with the Schutzbund, was of decisive importance for the future of the C.P. of Austria. The Austrian Communists who, when the fight was on, were able to point out the correct line of struggle for soviets and for the dictatorship of the proletariat, at the very moment when social-democracy displayed its complete bankruptcy, were thus able to attract the revolutionary elements of Austrian social-democracy to the work of the C.P. of Austria. In this way the Communists caused such a ferment among the social-democratic functionaries that the majority of them have broken with the official Social-Democratic Party of Austria and are finally coming over to the Communists. Austrian social-democracy no longer sneers at the Communist Party of Austria as previously. The C.P. of Austria is now the center around which the entire revolutionary movement of Austria will revolve. If the Communists had not fought side by side with the Schutzbund, I think that they could not have achieved the success they have done.

The C.P. of Great Britain is not going ahead as much as is possible and desirable. This is true of course, but the yardstick for the C.P.G.B. must be a different one than that used for other Communist Parties. The position of the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1934 cannot be compared with the situation in 1933. The C.P.G.B. has obtained successes. How did it secure joint activity with the I.L.P.? Only by successfully leading the struggle of the unemployed after the government had cut the wages of workers, office employees and civil servants and had reduced the unemployment "dole" by 10 per cent. This movement was a big one, a tremendous one, and was directed by the unemployed organization which is under the influence of the C.P.G.B. There have not been such big demonstrations in England since the days of the Chartists. This is why there has been a swing over in a number of trade unions in favor of the Communist Party of Great Britain and this is what compelled the I.L.P. to join with the C.P.G.B. in the organization of the united front, and what caused a ferment in the ranks of the I.L.P. If this activity had not taken place, if there had not been these demonstrations, organized by the unemployed organizations which are close to the C.P.G.B., the latter would not have achieved these successes. A wide road has opened up before the Communist Party of Great Britain. A number of trade unions, (railway, engineers) have passed resolutions in the spirit of the Communist Party. The C.P.G.B. is winning different trade union branches and various elected positions. It is already competing against the reformists in the elections for union posts. In some cases it has received only one or two thousand votes less than the reformists (our candidate received 40,000 votes against 42,000 for the reformist). This is undoubtedly a step forward. The C.P.G.B. has only secured these successes by showing, even if only by the example of the unemployed struggle, that it is able to fight.

Take the little Belgian Communist Party. The Labor Party of Belgium never took it seriously. But now, after the Communist Party took an active part in the miners' strike, it has become a definite force, and see how politely the Social-Democratic Party replied to the proposal of the C.P. of Belgium regarding the united front. In its reply to the C.P. of Belgium, this big party (the Belgian L.P.) says that the little Belgian Communist Party makes attacks on it in the *Drapeau Rouge* which comes out once a week! Why did the Belgian Labor Party reply to the C.P. of Belgium, and moreover so tearfully? Because the Belgian Communists have shown that they lead strikes or help strikes, and give correct slogans, and so the workers gather around them.

What are the conclusions to be drawn? In order successfully to carry on the united front, the Communist Parties must work, they must go to the masses, must extend their influence, and in this way they will exert pressure on those strata of the workers who still follow the other parties. And the comrades must not imagine that it is sufficient to write an appeal, even if formulated in the most correct way possible, for the united front to be established. This is of course insufficient. They must work, carry on mass work, and be able to extend their influence and thus extend the united front. And what does the establishment of the united front mean for the Communist Parties? It means a great deal. I think that very many comrades underestimate the importance of this question. Firstly, it

has been possible to bring about the joint struggle of the Communists and the social-democrats, a thing which had not been done for a period of 14 years, despite all our attempts to do so; and now the Communists and the social-democrats who opposed each other, and railed at each other, are carrying on a joint struggle, and this joint struggle is meeting with great success. Do you think that any social-democratic party is powerful enough to hold the masses back and to prevent the possibility of further joint struggle? They will not be able to do it. And if the social-democrats are against this struggle, if they do not permit the organization of the united front, while we nevertheless bring it about over their heads with their local organizations, this will make it possible for us to liberate the masses from the influence of the reformists, and to come closer to those revolutionary elements who agree to the joint struggle. You cannot stop them now! This is of tremendous importance. The Austrian revolutionary social-democrats wrote a letter to the Second International in which they proposed that a united front of struggle, of social-democrats and Communists be established if only in fascist countries. I think that in establishing the united front in the fascist countries, we will be able to do without the Second International. Things are not so bad in Austria. The Communists and the revolutionary socialists are carrying on a joint struggle against the fascists. In Germany (although Stampfer wrote that the Social-Democratic Party of Germany was already dead but that after the events of June 30 it will rise again), we should not sit and wait to see whether it will rise or not. We must do everything in our power so that the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, as such, should no longer be able to exist. And this depends to a great degree on the energetic and correct work of the Communist Party of Germany, from top to bottom. Comrade Knorin has said that if the Communists in Germany have not achieved such successes in attracting the social-democratic workers to their side as the C.P. of Austria, this must be attributed to the insufficient work of the Party. He is absolutely right. It should be emphasized still more firmly that if the local organizations of the C.P. of Germany do not change their tactics towards the social-democratic groups which are working in Germany itself—and although they are not formally connected with one another they nevertheless meet, carry on discussions, etc. (former members of the reformist trade unions do the same)—there is the danger that if other times arrive in Germany and the "Lefts" appear (real and pseudo), they will be able to bring the German Social-Democratic Party back to life, even though not in its previous form. I do not want to be a prophet. It would be better if I prove to be wrong. But this may happen. Therefore there must be a 90-degree change in the tactics of our Party in relation to the social-democratic workers and the existing social-democratic groups in Germany itself. Social-democrats who have come into our Party, are by the condescension of the "pure" Communists, transformed into third grade Party members. They are not allowed to come right into the Party, they are not drawn into the Party's work, and efforts are not made through them to influence other social-democratic workers who are not so near to us. This is a crime. The C.C. of the C.P. of Germany is struggling against such things. We give it our fullest support. This practice must be radically changed. Communists must propose the establishment of the united front in the struggle against fascism to the existing social-democratic groups which publish illegal literature and carry on a struggle against fascism.

I will now say a few words about Comrade Losovsky's speech. I do not think we should follow his advice, that if Communists call meetings jointly with the socialists, at which the broad masses are present, we should advocate our whole program at once there, although the united front of struggle was established only against the fascists. Comrade Losovsky advises us to state at these meetings that fascism can be destroyed only when the dictatorship of the proletariat is set up. At such meetings which are called for the struggle against fascism, it is inadvisable to do this, because this is only true when we speak of fascism in general and not of fascism in those countries where the fascists are still fighting for power. The united front in such countries can prevent them coming to power. In countries like France and Great Britain, we demand a joint struggle against fascism immediately, so as not to let it get into power. This struggle, of course, must help towards the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship. The proposal made by Comrade Losovsky resembles the old methods. And, to show how not to approach the question of negotiations regarding the united front, I will use the example of the proposal made by the American C.P. to the Socialist Party of America. What conditions were put forward there? One of the conditions for the united front was the liberation of the Negroes. I am not against the liberation of the Negroes, as you all know, but the socialists are very much against it. To begin with the liberation of the Negroes means to know in advance that nothing will come of the united front. But there are points which could at least unite those workers who follow the socialists, such as to strike together with the trade union affiliated to the A. F. of L. This question is extremely urgent in America, because there is no country where there are such strikes, and nowhere

do they pass off with such torments as in America, when the entire apparatus of the police, the entire apparatus of the employers' thugs are directed against the strikers, when there is hardly a single strike where there are no killed and wounded. And if only we could get a united front on this question, it would have a terrific effect. And once the workers saw the result, then we could raise the question of the liberation of the Negroes, and other similar questions as well.

The Socialist Party of America will find it difficult to reject the proposal for a united front in the strike struggle, against terror in this struggle, for the workers are spontaneously in revolt against these methods. If the Socialist Party were to reject such a united front, it would discredit itself in the eyes of the workers. If, however, it refused to carry on a joint struggle for the liberation of the Negroes, this would pass unnoticed by the overwhelming majority of the American workers.

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